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ABSTRACT 
 
Cash holding is on average more valuable when firms are managed by overconfident CEOs. 
Economically, having an overconfident CEO on board is associated with an increase of $0.28 in 
the value of $1.00 cash holding. The positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash 
concentrates among firms that are more likely to suffer from the underinvestment problem (i.e., 
financially constrained firms which exhibit high growth opportunities). In addition, CEO 
overconfidence affects negatively the value of cash in firms that are financially unconstrained, a 
finding which is consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. The results are robust to various 
tests and alternative explanations.  
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1. Introduction 
Starting from the pioneering works of Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Pinkowitz, Stulz 
and Williamson (2006), numerous studies have analyzed the value of cash holdings (i.e., the value 
the market assigns to an additional dollar of cash holding).1 The traditional views are that the value 
of cash depends: (i) on the information asymmetry between managers and the capital markets 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)); and (ii) on agency problems that arise due to misalignment of 
managerial and shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling (1976)).2 These studies assume that 
CEOs are rational. However, a growing body in the corporate finance literature finds that CEO 
characteristics and behavioral biases affect corporate policies and decisions (see, for instance, 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Malmendier and Tate (2005), (2008), Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and 
Huang and Kisgen (2013)). Motivated by this literature, this study investigates how CEO 
overconfidence, one of the most prominent behavioral biases, affects the value of cash. 
To develop our empirical predictions, we build our theoretical reasoning based on the model 
derived in Malmendier and Tate (2005). The model assumes an efficient capital market where 
there are two types of CEOs in the economy: rational CEOs and overconfident CEOs. Both CEO 
types maximize shareholder value. The only friction in the model comes from the overconfident 
CEO’s perception about the firm’s future cash flows; that is, overconfident CEOs overestimate the 
firm's future cash flows. This implies that: (i) overconfident CEOs perceive their firm as being 
undervalued by the market (Malmendier and Tate (2005)); and (ii) overconfident CEOs 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Denis and Sibilkov 
(2010), Frésard and Salva (2010), Liu and Mauer (2011),  Harford et al. (2014), and Chen et al. (2017).  
2 Under information asymmetry, capital market frictions increase the cost of external finance relative to internal 
finance, inducing cash-poor firms with high growth opportunities to underinvest. Cash holding is therefore valuable 
for these firms as it allows them to further deplete their investment opportunities (see, e.g., Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010)). Under the agency theory, powerful managers may waste cash by reaping 
private benefits. Consequently, cash holding has a lower value in firms affected by agency problems (see, e.g., 
Faulkender and Wang (2006), Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)). 
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misperceive the cost of capital required by rational creditors and equity investors for providing 
external financing to the firm (Malmendier et al. (2011)). More specifically, overconfident CEOs 
avoid external financing, as it is perceived to be relatively more costly, and rely more on internal 
funds to finance their investment opportunities.3  
An important implication of this theoretical framework is that the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on firm investment and the marginal value of cash will depend on the availability 
of internal financing (i.e., cash reserves and operating cash flows). Specifically:   
- If internal financing is more than sufficient to fund all positive NPV projects, overconfident 
CEOs exhibit an excessive willingness to invest relative to rational CEOs. Consistent with this 
notion, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) document that CEO overconfidence in cash rich firm 
is associated with capital expenditure distortions and excessive mergers and acquisitions 
activity, which leads to negative market reactions upon announcements. Under this 
overinvestment hypothesis, CEO overconfidence may affect negatively the value of cash, 
because additional cash holdings might further exacerbate overinvestment by the funding of 
value destroying projects; 
- If internal financing is insufficient to fund all positive NPV projects, however, overconfident 
CEOs may underinvest relative to rational CEOs; this is the case when overconfident CEOs 
perceive external financing cost to be higher than the perceived investment return.4 Along these 
lines, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2015) show that CEO overconfidence amplifies the 
sensitivity of corporate investment to internally generated cash, suggesting that the average firm 
                                                          
3 Heaton (2002) suggests that overconfident managers prefer internal financing to external funds for investment 
projects and Malmendier et al. (2011) find that overconfident managers are less likely to use external finance and issue 
less equity. However, recently, Banerjee et al. (2015) provide evidence that overconfident CEOs are also more likely 
to conduct SEOs in order to increase investment (in CAPEX and R&D), stockpile cash, and continue acquisition 
activity. 
4 Under this scenario, overconfident CEOs with insufficient internal financing may tap external finance and overinvest 
if and only if the perceived investment return is higher than the perceived financing cost (Malmendier et al. (2011)). 
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with an overconfident CEO behaves as if it is financially constrained.5 Therefore, under this 
costly external finance hypothesis, the value of cash should be positively associated with CEO 
overconfidence, as additional cash holding may allow the firm to alleviate potential 
underinvestment problem. 
In general, both the overinvestment and costly external finance hypotheses may coexist and 
affect the value of cash. This is particularly important because each hypothesis has different policy 
implications and extant overconfidence literature puts largely the emphasis on the overinvestment 
hypothesis (see, e.g., Roll (1986) and Malmendier and Tate (2005), (2008)).6 Furthermore, if both 
hypotheses coexist empirically, then which of these two hypotheses dominates for the average firm 
with an overconfident CEO is an open empirical question.  
To investigate these questions, we rely on one obvious dimension where the empirical 
predictions of overinvestment and costly external finance hypotheses differ; that is the value that 
the market assigns to firm’s cash holding. Furthermore, Halford et al. (2017) emphasize that the 
marginal value of cash holdings offers an appealing tool to investigate the value consequences of 
various firm outcomes and environments. In addition, as pointed out by Halford et al. (2017), the 
reasons are that cash is comparable across firms, and it can be quickly deployed either to 
exacerbate overinvestment by the funding of value-destructive projects or to alleviate 
underinvestment by the exploitation of valuable growth opportunities. Finally, cash is relatively 
more homogeneous in comparison to corporate investment (i.e., capital expenditures, R&D, 
mergers and acquisitions), which may differ substantially in terms of risk and liquidity 
                                                          
5 Malmendier and Tate (2005) also argue that additional cash flow provides an opportunity for overconfident CEOs 
to invest closer to their desired level. 
6 In fact, Malmendier and Tate (2015) on page 39 are cautious about the implications that arise from CEO 
overconfidence by stating: “…In considering how CEO overconfidence might affect decision-making, it is important 
to model an explicit decision-making framework that offers predictions about how rational CEOs will differ from 
overconfident CEOs. As an example of the pitfalls that can arise with a model-free approach, we point to the common 
intuition equating hubris with corporate overinvestment.” 
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characteristics across firms. Therefore, the value of cash framework is well suited to examine the 
overinvestment / underinvestment hypotheses. 
We test our empirical questions using a measure of overconfidence based on revealed beliefs 
as captured by CEO’s option exercising behavior (see, e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2008) and 
Malmendier et al. (2011)) and the valuation approach of Faulkender and Wang (2006). This 
approach uses excess equity returns to estimate the marginal value of additional cash. Controlling 
for other known determinants of the value of cash, the results show a strong positive relation 
between CEO overconfidence and the marginal value of an additional dollar of cash. This relation 
is driven by firms with high - than low - degree of CEO confidence. In economic terms, having an 
overconfident CEO on board increases the value of $1.00 cash holding by an additional amount of 
$0.28 relative to a firm run by a rational CEO. These results are robust to controlling for firm fixed 
effects that remove the impact of time-invariant firm characteristics. Furthermore, a propensity 
score matching assures that the CEO overconfidence effect is not explained by observable 
differences (such as firm or CEO characteristics) between firms managed by overconfident versus 
rational CEOs. In addition, we find similar results using two alternative proxies of overconfidence 
based on business press portrayal of the CEO and CEOs/CFOs gender (i.e., male). Finally, we 
control for cash regimes following the approach advocated by Halford et al. (2017); as expected 
under the costly external finance hypothesis, we find that the positive effect of CEO 
overconfidence on the marginal value of cash is particularly strong in firms that are in the raising 
cash regime (i.e., these are firms that require external finance to fund valuable projects). 
We consider a variety of alternative explanations. First, CEO heterogeneous characteristics 
may be related to late option exercising behavior. Thus, the option-based measure of CEO 
overconfidence may be positively associated with the value of cash, through other mechanisms, 
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besides overconfidence. Such characteristics include CEO ability and risk tolerance aptitudes. 
More able managers may expect strong future performance, thus refraining from option exercising 
even if they are deep in the money. Similarly, more risk tolerant CEOs may also be reluctant to 
exercise their options. At the same time, they are expected to implement riskier firm policies and 
accumulate optimally higher cash reserves (Acharya et al. (2012)). Controlling for managerial 
ability and risk tolerance, however, does not affect the results. Second, an endogenous matching 
between CEO and firm characteristics could create spurious results when latent firm characteristics 
that correlate with the value of cash induce firms to appoint overconfident CEOs. We therefore re-
run the main analysis and find qualitatively similar results after excluding from the sample 
observations for which CEO tenure is less than one year, less than three years, and less than five 
years, which likely relate more to the appointment decision, and thus could potentially cause a 
spurious relationship.  
Overall, the results support the view that CEO overconfidence affects positively the value of 
cash and that the costly external finance hypothesis dominates the overinvestment hypothesis for 
the average firm with an overconfident CEO. To further examine the validity of both hypotheses, 
we use subsamples of firms that exhibit different degrees of financial constraints. Overinvestment 
is more likely when the firm has abundant resources (i.e., financially unconstrained), while 
underinvestment is more likely when the firm has limited resources (i.e., financially constrained). 
The results show that among financially unconstrained firms CEO overconfidence affects 
negatively the value of cash, providing support to the overinvestment hypothesis. In contrast, 
among financially constrained firms, the results show a positive relation between CEO 
overconfidence and the value of cash, consistent with the costly external finance hypothesis.  
6 
 
Finally, we also examine which firms are more likely to be affected by the costly external 
finance hypothesis. Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to pursue innovation and exploit growth opportunities. Therefore, 
underinvestment problems should be more pronounced among financially constrained firms that 
exhibit high innovative growth opportunities. We test this perspective using industry R&D 
expenditures as a proxy for the existence of innovative growth opportunities. Industry expenditures 
are largely exogenous to firm growth opportunities, and thus, help to alleviate potential 
endogeneity concerns about the relation between the level of firms’ cash holdings and the 
availability of growth opportunities. The results, as expected, show that the positive effect of CEO 
overconfidence on the value of cash concentrates among financially constrained firms with high 
growth opportunities. These results imply that additional cash benefits financially constrained 
firms with overconfident CEOs in the presence of high growth opportunities. Therefore, consistent 
with theoretical models that discuss benefits to overconfidence, such as those of Goel and Thakor 
(2008) and Gervais et al. (2011), underinvestment is more value destroying for shareholders when 
opportunities to benefit from overconfidence are present.  
Our study offers important contributions to prior literature. We contribute to the cash holding 
literature by showing that CEO overconfidence, an important managerial trait, affects on average 
the value of cash holdings. Prior literature emphasizes the role of a firm’s financial constraint status 
(see, e.g., Faulkender and Wang 2006), growth opportunities (see, e.g., Denis and Sibilkov (2010)), 
corporate governance (see, e.g., Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007)), and CEO risk-taking incentives (Liu and Mauer (2011)). Controlling 
for these well-known determinants of the value of cash, this study adds to the literature by 
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documenting that CEO overconfidence affects positively the value of cash on average, and 
particularly in the presence of financial constraints and high growth opportunities.  
The study also contributes to the managerial overconfidence literature. Existing literature 
has primarily focused on investment (Malmendier and Tate (2005), (2008)), innovation 
(Hirshleifer et al. (2012)), earnings management forecasts (Hribar and Yang (2015)), financing 
(Malmendier et al. (2011)), payout policies (Deshmukh et al. (2013)), and stakeholder 
commitments (Phua et al. (2018)). Less is known, however, about the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on firm’s cash policy. Deshmukh et al. (2016) examine the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on the level of cash holdings. We complement this study by showing that 
additional cash is valuable for overconfident CEOs, as it allows the firm to further exhaust its 
investment opportunities.  
Finally, we contribute indirectly to the impact of managerial overconfidence on 
(over/under)investment. Particularly, Malmendier and Tate (2005), (2015) show that CEO 
overconfidence amplifies the sensitivity of corporate investment to internally generated cash. 
While it is hardly questionable that financial slack affects investments by overconfident CEOs, it 
is less clear whether this leads their firms to systematically overinvest or underinvest. One obvious 
dimension along which the empirical predictions of the (over/under)investment differ is the value 
that the market assigns to additional cash. Thus, our findings are useful to understand how CEO 
overconfidence affects firm value. A strand of the literature demonstrates that overconfident 
managers implement value destroying corporate investments (see, e.g., Roll (1986) and 
Malmendier and Tate (2008)), emphasizing the effect of managerial overconfidence on 
overinvestment for financially unconstrained firms. We corroborate these results as we find a 
negative effect of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash for firms that are financially 
8 
 
unconstrained. However, in an important departure from prior literature, this study highlights also 
the importance of the underinvestment problem for the average firm with an overconfident CEO. 
Specifically, we show that additional cash holdings allow overconfident CEOs to alleviate 
underinvestment problem increasing their firm’s value. This relation concentrates among firms 
that are financially constrained and exhibit high growth opportunities. Therefore, this finding is 
consistent with another strand of the literature that shows that managerial overconfidence may 
create value in certain settings, for instance, by pursuing good but risky projects (Campbell et al. 
(2011), Goel and Thakor (2008), Galasso and Simcoe (2011) and Gervais et al. (2011)), and by 
encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation (Bernardo and Welch (2001) and Hirshleifer et al. 
(2012)). 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample, the measure 
of CEO overconfidence, and the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 examines the 
impact of CEO overconfidence on the value of an additional dollar of cash holdings and considers 
several robustness checks and potential alternative explanations. Section 4 investigates whether 
CEO overconfidence affects the value of cash through the underinvestment or overinvestment 
channel by utilizing the firm’s financial constraint status (and growth opportunities). Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Data, Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
2.1  Data Sources and Sample Selection 
To construct the sample, we use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to obtain 
stock returns, and Standard and Poor’s Compustat Industrial Annual (CIA) and ExecuComp 
databases to obtain accounting- and CEO- related information. The initial sample consists of the 
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intersection of firms that are included in the above-mentioned databases. We exclude firms in the 
financial and utility sectors (SIC codes between 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively). Further, 
consistent with Faulkender and Wang (2006), we eliminate firm-year observations with negative 
sales, negative net assets, negative dividends and negative capital expenditures. Finally, we 
exclude firm-year observations with market value of equity less than 25 million in constant 2013 
dollars. The final sample consists of 12,105 firm-year observations and covers the period 1993-
2013.  
 
2.2  Measure of CEO Overconfidence 
Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2005), we measure managerial overconfidence using a CEO 
stock options proxy, which we label as overconfident CEO. In particular, the measure of 
overconfidence is based on CEOs’ revealed beliefs captured by their preference not to exercise 
stock options timely, as would typically be optimal for risk-averse undiversified executives, 
though they are deep in the money (Hall and Murphy (2002)). We exploit information about all 
outstanding options held by a CEO that are directly observable starting in 2006 due to requirements 
from the FAS 123R and we identify CEOs who, at least once during the period 2006-2013, hold 
an option until the year of expiration, even though the stock option is at least 40% in-the-money 
entering its final year. For the median firm, the percentage of in-the-money options held to 
expiration entering the final year in our sample is 99.47%. Therefore, given that a typical option 
has a 10-year duration and is fully vested by the fifth year, longholder captures habitual, rather 
than time-varying, failure of CEOs to diversify across several years. Accordingly, we back filled 
the classifications of each CEO during her entire tenure for the period 1993-2013; that is, we apply 
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this measure as a CEO fixed effect. Finally, CEOs that never exercise options do not reveal beliefs 
and, thus, we exclude them from the sample.7  
We further group overconfident CEOs into low versus high degree of confidence. 
Specifically, the measure of overconfidence is based on CEOs’ preference not to exercise stock 
options timely, though they are at least 40% in the money. The threshold of 40% is based on the 
model of Hall and Murphy (2002) assuming a constant relative risk aversion of three and 67% of 
wealth in firm stock. Thus, by changing this threshold, we may extract information about different 
degrees of CEO confidence. We define CEOs that hold an option until the year of expiration, and 
the option entering its final year is less (greater) than 66.22% in the money, to exhibit low (high) 
degree of confidence. The threshold of 66.22% is the 25th percentile in-the-money option value of 
the sample.  
 
2.3  Summary Statistics 
Table 1 provides information about the frequency of overconfident CEOs in our sample. On 
average, the option-based overconfidence measure identifies a proportion of 27.72% of 
overconfident CEOs-years, which is slightly greater than the 22.18% reported by Malmendier et 
al. (2011). Our measure identifies relatively more overconfident CEO-year observations because 
a CEO who is identified as overconfident in any year, retains this classification during her entire 
tenure. This, in addition, implies that the proportion of overconfident CEOs should increase across 
time. This pattern is evident in the early rather than the late years of the sample period; that is 
                                                          
7 The exclusion of CEOs that never exercise options from the final sample might raise a sample selection bias problem. 
Thus, to investigate whether such bias affects our results, we keep those CEOs in the sample and classify them as 
rational. Then, we re-run the main analysis. Since some of these (unclassified) CEOs might be overconfident, this 
approach is conservative and is biasing against finding significant differences in the value of cash between 
overconfident and rational CEOs. Despite that, untabulated results show that our main findings remain qualitatively 
similar. 
11 
 
perhaps due to increased CEO turnovers during the later years of the sample period (see, e.g., 
Kaplan and Minton (2011)) or forced turnovers of excessively optimistic CEOs (Campbell et al. 
(2011)). The average proportion of high-confident CEOs is 20.81% in our sample.  
[Please Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about firm and CEO characteristics. Overconfident 
CEOs manage smaller firms. For instance, the median assets and sales of firms with overconfident 
CEOs are significantly lower than the assets and sales of firms with rational CEOs. In our sample, 
firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit lower sales growth and Tobin’s Q, larger cash reserves, 
greater debt to total assets (leverage), and lower profitability as measured by return on assets than 
firms with rational CEOs. Interestingly, these firms also spend more on research and development 
(R&D) to net assets. The latter statistic, consistent with Galaso and Simcoe (2011) and Hirshleifer 
et al. (2012), shows that overconfident CEOs invest more in innovation. Regarding CEO 
characteristics, there is no significant difference in the age and risk-taking incentives (i.e., vega) 
between overconfident and rational CEOs, while overconfident CEOs receive lower incentive 
compensation associated to stock performance (i.e., delta).  
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
3.  CEO Overconfidence and the Value of Cash 
3.1  Baseline Estimate 
To measure the impact of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash holdings, we adopt the 
valuation model suggested by Faulkender and Wang (2006). This model examines whether a 
change in cash holdings leads to a change in firm value. We augment the Faulkender and Wang’s 
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(2006) baseline model with our overconfidence variable and its interaction with the change in cash 
holding variable. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐵 = 𝛾0 + 𝛽1
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽2𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂 (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂 (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 ×
∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾 ′𝑋 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
where the dependent variable is firm i’s excess return from year t – 1 to year t, which corresponds 
to the difference between firm i’s stock return and the return of firm i’s benchmark portfolio over 
the same period. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), the benchmark portfolios are the Fama-
French (1993) 25 value-weighted portfolios constructed by independent sorting stocks on size and 
book-to-market characteristics.8 ∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the change in cash holdings from year t – 1 to year t. 
Following Faulkender and Wang (2006), ∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is scaled by the market value of equity at the end 
of the previous year (𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1). This procedure allows to interpret the coefficient 𝛽1 as the dollar 
change in shareholder wealth for a one-dollar change in cash holdings. 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is 
the longholder proxy for CEO overconfidence. The vector 𝑋 includes the set of firm-specific 
characteristics from the Faulkender and Wang’s baseline model in order to control for changes in 
firms’ profitability, financial policy, and investment policy. These firm-specific control variables 
are: (1) ∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡, the change in earnings before extraordinary items; (2) ∆𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡, the change in net 
assets; (3) ∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡, the change in research and development expenses; (4) ∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡, the change in 
interest expenses; (5) ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡, the change in common dividends; (6) 𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡, the firm’s net financing; 
and (7) 𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1, the firm’s cash holdings at the end of the previous year. All these variables are 
scaled by the market value of equity at the end of the previous year (𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1). The specification 
                                                          
8 Each sample firm is assigned to size and book-to-market portfolios using the size and book-to-market breakpoints 
obtained from Kenneth French’s website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/). 
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includes also the market leverage of the firm (𝐿𝑖,𝑡), the interaction between ∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1⁄  and 
𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ , and the interaction between 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 and ∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ .  
In Equation (1), 𝛽2 measures the direct effect of CEO overconfidence on excess stock 
returns, while 𝛽3, our coefficient estimate of interest, measures the impact of CEO overconfidence 
on the marginal value of cash. A significantly positive (negative) 𝛽3 coefficient indicates that an 
additional one dollar of cash holding is worth more (less) for firms managed by overconfident 
CEOs relative to firms managed by rational CEOs. 
We estimate Equation (1) after including year and industry fixed effects to control for time 
and industry trends on excess returns. In addition to reduce the impact of influential observations 
we winsorize all continuous variables at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.9 Panel A of Table 3 reports 
the results. In specification (1) we use the baseline model of Faulkender and Wang (2006), whereas 
in specification (2) we further control for the age of the CEO, as well as the stock price sensitivity 
(delta) and the stock return volatility sensitivity (vega) of the CEO’s incentive compensation, and 
the interaction terms of age, delta and vega with ∆𝐶𝑖,𝑡. In specification (3), we re-run the same 
specification as in specification (2) but we group overconfident CEOs into low versus high degree 
of confidence. The variables of interest in this specification are the interaction terms between low 
and high CEO confidence and the change in cash holdings.   
The results show that having overconfident CEOs on board significantly increases the value 
of a dollar of cash both economically and statistically, as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction between the change in cash and overconfident CEO in specifications 
                                                          
9 We obtain qualitatively similar results without any winsorization or by changing the winsorization thresholds. We 
use the 2.5% winsorization threshold throughout the paper in order to have more consistent result with prior literature 
for the marginal value of cash holding. Decreasing (increasing) the threshold increases (decreases) the marginal value 
of cash for the average firm but does not qualitatively affect the relation between CEO overconfidence and the 
marginal value of cash. 
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(1) and (2). The coefficient estimate of the interaction term in specification (1) indicates that the 
value that the stock market assigns to a dollar of cash is $0.29 greater for a firm managed by an 
overconfident CEO relative to a firm run by a rational CEO (p<0.01). Similarly, the corresponding 
value in specification (2) with the full set of controls is $0.28 (p<0.01). Finally, in specification 
(3) the results show that high CEO confidence rather than low CEO confidence drives the previous 
relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash. Particularly, relative to rational 
CEOs, the value that the stock market assigns to a dollar of cash is $0.31 greater for a firm with a 
high confident CEO (p<0.01). For low confident CEOs the stock market does not assign a different 
dollar of cash relative to rational CEOs.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports the marginal value of cash for the average firm in the full sample 
as well as conditional on the CEO being classified as overconfident or not. To estimate the 
corresponding marginal value, we use the coefficient estimates on the change in cash and each 
coefficient that is interacted with the change in cash in Panel A of Table 3. Specifically, to compute 
the marginal value of a change in cash for the average firm we start with the coefficient estimate 
of the change in cash and add the product between the respective coefficients on the cash change 
interactions and the sample means of the interaction variables. Using the coefficient estimates in 
specification (1), we find that a dollar of cash is worth approximately $1.29 for the average firm 
in our sample.10, 11 The corresponding value is $1.25 in specification (2) with the full set of 
                                                          
10 The marginal value of cash is calculated as follows (in $): 1.547 + (0.285  0.277) + (-0.812  0.132) + (-1.312  
0.178) = 1.29.   
11 In comparison, Faulkender and Wang (2006) report a marginal value of cash of $0.94. The difference between our 
estimate and theirs is likely due to the differences in the sample periods and the fact that we only consider firms 
included in the ExecuComp database with equity value higher than $25 million, while Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
use firms included in Compustat with positive equity value. The other sample selection criteria are similar. In 
Appendix B, we estimate model (1) using the period 1972-2001 (i.e., sample period in Faulkender and Wang (2006)) 
and applying our sample selection criteria. In this sample, the marginal value of cash is $0.89, a figure very close to 
the estimate in Faulkender and Wang (2006). In Appendix B, models (2) and (3) compare for the same sample period 
(from 1993 to 2013) a sample of observations extracted from Compustat with a sample from ExecuComp using our 
initial filters. The marginal value of cash increases from $1.25 to $1.34. In model (4) of Appendix B, we estimate the 
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controls, and $1.29 in specification (3) when splitting the sample into high and low confident 
CEOs, respectively; this suggests that the (unconditional) marginal value of cash for the average 
firm in the sample is not materially affected by the inclusion of the CEO-specific control variables 
into the specification. However, the marginal value of cash can increase to $1.45-$1.49 if the firm 
is managed by an overconfident CEO (see specifications (1) and (2)), or to $1.54 if it is managed 
by a high confident CEO (see specification (3)). Alternatively, an additional one dollar of cash 
holding in a firm managed by a rational CEO is worth substantially less, with a value that ranges 
between $1.17-$1.23 (see specifications (1) through (3)).  
In summary, the results indicate that having overconfident CEOs on board is associated with 
a positive impact on the marginal value of cash. This finding suggests that the costly external 
finance hypothesis dominates the overinvestment hypothesis for the average firm with an 
overconfident CEO.  
[Please Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
3.2    Robustness Checks 
In this section, we perform several additional tests to assess the robustness of our results.  
 
3.2.1 Controlling for Firm Fixed Effects 
In addition to the large set of control variables we use in the analysis, including firm fixed 
effects allows us to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. However, consistent with the theory 
that overconfidence is a persistent trait, the option-based measure of CEO overconfidence is a 
                                                          
baseline model (specification (2) in Table II) of Faulkender and Wang (2006) using the sample of observations for 
which the overconfidence variable is available. For this sample, the marginal value of cash is $1.32. Hence, the 
discrepancy between our estimate and the one of Faulkender and Wang (2006) has primarily two sources: the sample 
period and the data source. Bates et al. (2018) also document an increasing trend in the value of cash over time.   
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CEO fixed effect. So, examining the direct effect of CEO overconfidence on firm value (i.e., excess 
return) using a firm fixed effect model is impossible because the CEO overconfidence effect on 
firm value is subsumed by the firm fixed effects; only when there is within-firm variation of CEO 
overconfidence (i.e., when the overconfidence classification of a newly hired CEO is different 
from the classification of the previous CEO) it is possible to control for firm fixed effects – but 
this may induce sample selection bias. Fortunately, in our setting we are interested on whether the 
marginal value of cash is different between firms with overconfident and rational CEOs. This 
cross-sectional difference in the value of cash between overconfident and rational CEOs is 
captured by the coefficient estimate (β3) of the interaction term ΔCt  Overconfidentt. Since the 
first term in the interaction variable is time-varying, its effect on firm value can be estimated using 
a firm fixed effects model. 
Therefore, to control for unobserved time-invariant firm heterogeneity, we re-run the 
specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3, after controlling for firm fixed effects. If the estimated effects 
of CEO overconfidence in Table 3 are entirely due to firm fixed effects, the coefficient estimates 
should decline substantially in value and become insignificant when we include firm fixed effects. 
Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 4 report the results. The results show that the interaction terms 
of CEO overconfidence with the change in cash still carry positive and significant coefficients. 
Most importantly, as expected the magnitudes are slightly lower in comparison to the ones reported 
in Table 3, but the effect of CEO overconfidence on the marginal value of cash remains substantial. 
The coefficient estimate of the interaction term is 0.21, and indicates that the cross-sectional 
difference in the marginal value of cash between overconfident and rational CEOs is $0.21. 
[Please Insert Table 4 About Here] 
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3.2.2 Propensity Score Matching  
If firms with overconfident CEOs are fundamentally different from those with rational 
CEOs, then the control variables employed in the main specification that capture linear relations 
may be inadequate. Under this assumption, the results could be biased and may pick up non-linear 
effects of the control variables on firm value. To alleviate concerns over such functional form 
misspecification biases, we create two data samples that are comparable across all the control 
variables, but differ only on whether the CEO is overconfident or rational. To construct these 
samples, we implement a propensity score matching (PSM) process following Drucker and Puri 
(2005) and match firms with overconfident CEOs in our sample with firms exhibiting similar 
characteristics but have rational CEOs on board. Specifically, the method consists of a probit 
regression to estimate propensity scores, p(Y=1/X=x), based on the probability of receiving a 
binary treatment, Y, conditional on all the control variables, x. In our setting, we consider having 
an overconfident CEO as treatment and we estimate the probability of having an overconfident 
CEO using the independent variables based on the specification (2) of Table 3 (without including 
interaction terms of change in cash).12 Then, for each firm-year with an overconfident CEO we 
use the propensity score to find a comparable firm-year with a rational CEO based on the nearest-
neighbor method. To ensure the adequacy of the matching estimation method, we require that the 
absolute difference in propensity scores among pairs does not exceed 0.05. If there are more firms-
years with a rational CEO that meet this criterion, we retain the firm-year with the smallest 
difference in the propensity scores. Using this approach, we find 3,356 unique pairs of matched 
firms-years.  
                                                          
12 The results are robust to using the exact specification (2) of Table 3. 
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Panel A of Table 5 reports the difference-in-means of the independent variables for 
overconfident and rational CEOs for both the unmatched and matched samples, respectively. The 
t-statistics of the corresponding difference-in-means indicate that many variables differ 
significantly for the unmatched sample. As expected, however, almost all the considered 
independent variables are comparable for the matched sample; the only exception is the variable 
Vega/TC for which the difference-in-mean is statistically significant at the 10% level. Using this 
matched sample in Panel B of Table 5, we re-run the regressions as in models (2) and (3) of Table 
3. The results remain robust reaffirming that the CEO overconfidence effect is not an artifact of 
functional form misspecification biases.13  
[Please Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
3.2.3 Alternative Measures of Overconfidence 
The main analysis uses an option-based measure of CEO overconfidence based on revealed 
beliefs as captured by CEOs’ personal portfolio decisions that are overexposed to the idiosyncratic 
risk of their firms. We replicate our main analysis by using alternative proxies of CEO 
overconfidence based on: (i) outsiders’ perceptions of the CEO; and (ii) CEO/CFO gender. First, 
following Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Hirshleifer et al. (2012), we use a press-based measure 
of CEO overconfidence that we label overconfident CEOs (press) relying on hand-collected 
information from financial press articles over the period from 1992 to 2009. We use the available 
unique company code in Factiva to search for articles with keywords “the name or variants of the 
                                                          
13 Endogeneity arising from a potential positive relation between CEO overconfidence and high stock returns may 
complicate our analyses and results. In section 3.3.2 we explicitly discuss and address such concerns using various 
approaches. A complementary approach that mitigates endogeneity concerns would be to use the firm’s stock return 
as an additional criterion in the propensity score matching procedure to ensure that stock returns between 
overconfident CEO and rational CEO firm-years are not statistically different. When we do so, untabulated results 
show that our main findings remain robust.  
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name of the CEO” during her tenure period in the following financial media: New York Times, 
Business Week, Financial Times, The Times, Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Fortune, Forbes, 
Dow Jones Business News, and Dow Jones Online News. Information about the name and tenure 
of CEOs comes from the Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp.  
For each CEO and year, we record the total number of relevant articles with the following 
information: (i) articles containing the words “confident”, “confidence” or variants such as 
“overconfidence” and “over-confident”, (ii) the number of articles containing the words 
“optimistic”, “optimism” or variants such as “overoptimistic”, “over-optimism”, (iii) the number 
of articles using “pessimistic”, “pessimism” or variants such as “over-pessimistic”, and (iv) the 
number of articles using “cautious”, “reliable”, “steady”, “practical”, “conservative”, “frugal”, 
“not confident” or “not optimistic”  (or variants such as “not-confident” or “not-optimistic”). Each 
article has been carefully read to verify that the context of “confident/optimistic” or 
“pessimistic/cautious” characterizations are used in an appropriate manner and are only relevant 
to the CEO and company of interest. Our financial press-based overconfidence measure classifies 
a CEO as overconfident if the number of press articles describing the manager as 
“confident/optimistic” exceeds the number of articles describing the manager as 
“pessimistic/cautious”. In particular, we compare the number of articles that use the 
“confident/optimistic” terms as captured by categories (i) and (ii) and articles that use the 
“pessimistic/cautious” terms, as captured by categories (iii) and (iv) and measure CEO 
overconfidence for each CEO i in year t as: 
𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ∑ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑖=1 > ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑗
𝑡
𝑞=1
 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                     
,    (2) 
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where 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐹𝑖𝑗 is the number of articles using the “confident” terms and 𝐶𝐴𝑈𝑇𝑖𝑗 is the number of 
articles using the “cautious” terms. Our press-based measure cumulates articles starting from the 
first year the CEO is in office.14 Note that this measure allows a CEO to change from being 
overconfident to rational when the number of articles using the “cautious” terms is greater than 
the number of articles using the “confident” terms during a certain year.15 We run the same 
regression as in specification (2) of Table 3 including also the variable CEO articles and its 
interaction with the change in cash holdings as an additional control. Specification (1) of Table 6 
reports the results. Largely, the findings with the press-based proxy echo those obtained with the 
stock option-based measure in Table 3.  
Second, following Barber and Odean (2001) and Huang and Kisgen (2013) we use a gender-
based measure of overconfidence. Barber and Odean (2001) provide evidence that men are more 
overconfident than women and this behavior is reflected in relatively more aggressive stock trades 
and lower returns. Similarly, Huang and Kisgen (2013) show that male executives undertake more 
acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives, attributing these findings to 
managerial overconfidence. Thus, we rely on ExecuComp’s classification (data item Gender = 
Male) to identify male/female CEOs. In line with Huang and Kisgen’s (2013) approach, since the 
percentage of male CEOs in the sample is too high for a meaningful analysis, we also consider the 
gender of CFOs in order to increase the power of our test. Both executives play a significant role 
in major investment/financing decisions, which, as per our theoretical perspective, determine the 
value of cash. We label this measure as overconfident (Gender) and report the results in 
                                                          
14 Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp provides information about CEOs since 1992. From this information, it seems that 
many CEOs in our sample are in the office well before 1992. Thus, to avoid time bias truncation from omitted articles 
that characterizes CEOs prior to 1992, our article searches start from the first date the CEO is in the office. 
15 Since overconfidence is a persistent trait, as a robustness analysis, we have also used a time-invariant press-based 
proxy for CEO overconfidence. More precisely, once the CEO is classified as being overconfident using the press 
measure, he/she keep the classification for all the remaining CEO tenure. Unreported results remain qualitatively 
similar. 
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specification (2) of Table 6. Again, the results show that executive overconfidence positively 
affects the value of cash. Overall, our results corroborate our main findings and remain robust to 
the measure of overconfidence employed. 
[Please Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
3.2.4 Controlling for Corporate Governance 
Prior literature provides evidence that the quality of firm’s corporate governance relates to 
its cash policy. For instance, Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) and 
Kalcheva and Lins (2007) document a positive association between good corporate governance 
and the value of cash. Thus, to attenuate potential omitted variable bias, we estimate augmented 
regression models in which we control for firm’s governance structure.16 Table 7 presents the 
results. In specification (1) we control for the Bebchuk et al. (2009) entrenchment index. The 
entrenchment index is the sum of binary variables concerning the following provisions: (i) 
classified boards; (ii) limitations to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws; (iii) supermajority 
voting for business combinations; (iv) supermajority requirements for charter amendments; (v) 
poison pills; and (vi) golden parachutes. A high entrenchment index value represents strong 
managerial power. Accordingly, in our specification we use a dummy variable, good governance, 
to identify firms with low managerial power. These are sample firms that belong to the bottom 
tercile of the entrenchment index. In specification (3), we include a control for the board structure. 
We use an indicator variable identifying firms-years in which the CEO of the firm is also the 
chairman of the board (i.e., duality). CEO duality is associated with weak governance (Dahya et 
al. (2002)). Finally, in specification (5) we include controls for the ownership structure. Following 
                                                          
16 We report these results in this section rather than in the main analysis because many of these variables, due to data 
availability, reduce the sample size. 
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Bushee (1998), we include the percentage of institutional holdings by dedicated investors (DED), 
the percentage of institutional holdings by quasi indexers investors (QIX), and the percentage of 
institutional holdings by transient investors (TRA).17 Overall, the main findings remain robust to 
the inclusion of these variables. Additionally, in specifications (2), (4) and (6), we run similar 
regressions to specifications (1), (3), and (5), respectively, but this time by partitioning CEOs by 
degree of confidence. The results are similar and the impact of CEO overconfidence on the value 
of cash is more pronounced in firms with high confident CEOs. 
[Please Insert Table 7 About Here] 
 
3.2.5 Controlling for Cash Regimes 
In a recent study, Halford et al. (2017) emphasize the importance of controlling for cash 
regimes identified by Faulkender and Wang (2006) when estimating the value of cash. Prior 
literature mostly ignores cash regimes and that omission may lead to erroneous conclusions about 
the relations between firm/CEO characteristics and the value of cash. In this subsection, we assess 
whether our main result survives once we control for cash regimes. 
According to the foundational theory of Faulkender and Wang (2006), the marginal value of 
cash is expected to be a function of the firm’s cash regime. In particular, the marginal value of 
cash is likely to be higher in a firm that requires external capital to fund valuable projects (i.e., 
raising cash regime) in comparison to a firm with excess cash to distribute to shareholders (i.e., 
distributing cash regime).18 Intuitively, we expect the costly external finance hypothesis to be most 
                                                          
17 Information about the type of institutional investors is from Brian Bushee’s website 
(http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html). 
18 In our sample, the marginal value of cash is indeed higher in the raising cash regime, and the difference in value 
with the distribution regime is $0.56 (unreported result). These estimates are in line with the foundational theory. 
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relevant in the raising cash regime, and the overinvestment hypothesis to dominate in the 
distributing cash regime.  
In Table 8, we run the same regression as in specification (2) of Table 3 while controlling 
explicitly whether the firm is in the raising cash or distributing cash regime. We follow Halford et 
al. (2017) to identify cash regimes, that is, we rely on actual firm behaviors.19 In a given year, a 
firm is classified in the raising cash regime, if it issues equity for a value that is greater than 3% of 
the market value of equity and does not make dividend payment.20 In the same vein, a firm is 
classified in the distributing cash regime in a given year if it distributes cash to shareholders and 
does not belong to the raising cash regime. A firm distributes cash to shareholders when dividend 
payment is positive, or purchase of common and preferred stock is greater than equity issuance. 
 [Please Insert Table 8 About Here] 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 report the results for the subsample of firm-year observations 
in the raising cash regime. In column (1), the coefficient estimate of the interaction between CEO 
overconfidence and the change in cash is positive and significant, a result which is consistent with 
the costly external finance hypothesis. In economic terms, having an overconfident CEO in the 
raising cash regime increases the value of $1.00 cash holding by an additional amount of $0.63 
relative to a firm run by a rational CEO in the same cash regime. Column (2) of Table 8 indicates 
that the effect is almost comparable for CEOs with low and high confidence. Columns (3) and (4) 
show the results for firm-year observations in the distributing cash regime. Interestingly, the effect 
of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash is statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  
                                                          
19 Relying on the definition of cash regimes as in Faulkender and Wang (2006), yields a statistically significant CEO 
overconfidence effect on the marginal value of cash. Nevertheless, the sample size within regimes is very small; 
therefore, we choose to present and discuss the results based on the definition of cash regimes as in Halford et al. 
(2017). 
20 The cut-off point of 3% alleviates concerns over equity issuance which may result from employee-related exercising 
of stock options. Nevertheless, the results remain qualitatively similar if we rely on a 0% cut-off point (unreported).  
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A closer investigation of the firms-years within the raising cash regime reveals that 43.25% 
(24.9%) are classified as externally (internally and externally) financially constrained.21 Thus, the 
results, clearly provide additional support for the costly external finance hypothesis and are in line 
with our main results in Table 3. Overall, controlling for the cash regimes does not alter our main 
conclusions pertaining the average firm run by an overconfident CEO.  
 
3.3  Alternative Explanations 
3.3.1  Alternative Interpretations of Option Based Overconfidence Proxy 
In this section, we investigate whether the results are due to CEOs’ characteristics that 
correlate with CEOs’ option exercising behavior. Such characteristics include CEO ability and risk 
tolerance aptitudes. Particularly, more able CEOs are expected to perform better than less able 
CEOs. Thus, more able CEOs could also be inclined to refrain from option exercising and sale of 
the stock even if they are deep in the money. This implies that the relation between late exercisers 
and the value of cash may capture, besides overconfidence, superior CEO ability and expectations 
about positive performance in the future. To rule out such alternative interpretations, we augment 
the baseline specification with explicit controls for managerial ability and future stock 
performance. Panel A of Table 9 presents the results. Regarding managerial ability, we use in 
specifications (1) and (2) the index developed by Demerjian et al. (2012). This index is based on 
managers’ efficiency in generating revenues. In specifications (3) and (4) we use the age of the 
CEO when she took first office. Falato et al. (2015) argue that more talented individuals will need 
less time on the corporate ladder to become CEOs. Finally, in specifications (5) and (6) we control 
                                                          
21 See section 4.1 for the definitions of internal and external financial constraint status.  
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for next year’s stock returns. If late exercising correlates with expectations about future stock 
performance, then the CEO overconfidence effect should become smaller or cease to exist after 
controlling for future stock performance. Overall, in all specifications of Table 9, the results 
continue to show a positive relation between CEO overconfidence (i.e., late exercisers) and the 
value of cash, suggesting that neither managerial ability nor expectations about future stock 
performance drive this relation.  
Additionally, more risk tolerant CEOs may also be reluctant to exercise their options and 
sell their stocks. At the same time, risk tolerant CEOs may implement riskier firm policies. Riskier 
firms, however, accumulate optimally higher cash reserves (Acharya et al. (2012)), which may 
imply a positive relation between risk and the value of cash. To preclude the possibility that the 
option-based measure of CEO overconfidence captures risk tolerant CEOs, we include additional 
controls for firm risk. We use controls for firms’ credit risk and total risk. We measure credit risk: 
(i) using the probability of default calculated based on the Merton’s (1974) model and applying 
the simplified “naive” approach suggested by Bharath and Shumway (2008) (specifications (1) 
and (2)); and (ii) using the interest coverage ratio (i.e., pretax income plus depreciation and 
amortization plus interest and related expenses, scaled by interest and related expenses) as an 
inverse proxy for credit risk (specifications (3) and (4)). Firms that do not pay interest are excluded 
from the analysis. Finally, we measure total risk using stock return volatility (specifications (5) 
and (6)). The results in Panel B of Table 9 indicate that controlling for firm risk, our findings 
remain qualitatively similar.  
[Please Insert Table 9 About Here] 
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3.3.2 Non-Random CEO-Firm Matching  
Another possibility is that the positive association between CEO overconfidence and the 
value of cash is due to firm characteristics that correlate with the value of cash and induce firms 
to appoint overconfident CEOs. One approach to deal with non-random matching between CEO 
and firm due to latent firm characteristics is to analyze subsamples in which the matching issue is 
likely to be less severe (for a similar approach, see, Hirshleifer et al. (2012)). In particular, 
depending on the persistence of latent firm characteristics, matching should be stronger for 
recently appointed CEOs (i.e., these are CEOs with low tenures). We therefore re-examine the 
effects of CEO overconfidence on the value of cash for subsamples of CEOs with a certain level 
of tenure, eliminating from the sample firm-year observations of recently appointed CEOs. 
Because CEO overconfidence is a persistent trait whereas firm characteristics show less 
persistence and vary over time, these subsamples are more appropriate to identify the effect of 
CEO overconfidence on the value of cash that is largely free of any non-random CEO-firm 
matching bias. We consider three tenure cut-offs: strictly higher than one year, three years, and 
five years, respectively. Table 10 presents the results. Regardless the considered tenure cutoff 
point, the results show that the effect of CEO overconfidence on the marginal value of cash remains 
positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. Particularly the fact that the result holds 
almost with the same magnitude for CEOs with tenure of more than five years (see specifications 
(5) and (6)), should alleviate the possibility that the positive effect of CEO overconfidence on the 
value of cash comes from an endogenous selection of CEOs. 
[Please Insert Table 10 About Here] 
A second approach to deal with non-random matching between CEO and firm is to define 
specific firm characteristics that may drive this non-random matching. For instance, the board of 
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firms with high stock returns may hire overconfident CEOs (e.g., “flamboyance begets 
flamboyance”). If stock returns positively relate to the value of cash, then our results could be 
spurious and simply reflect reverse causality. To address such reverse causality concerns, we 
initially identify all the newly hired CEOs in our sample. Then, we check if stock returns during 
the year of hiring were above the median stock returns across all firms-years. Finally, we exclude 
all firms-years where such CEOs manage the firm and re-run our main analysis using the remaining 
firms-years which are unlikely to relate to this type of reverse causality explanation. Untabulated 
results remain qualitatively similar; thus, reverse causality arising from high stock returns is very 
unlikely to drive our findings.  
Stock returns may also give rise to a self-attribution bias explanation. Specifically, high stock 
returns may lead CEOs to become more overconfident. If so, and assuming that high stock returns 
positively relate with the value of cash, then our results could simply reflect an artifact of self-
attribution bias and high stock returns (note that this is another type of reverse causality 
explanation). While difficult to decisively preclude this potential explanation, we re-run our main 
analysis using only firms-years where stock returns were less than the median value across the 
CEO tenure. Such years, however, most likely exhibit low growth opportunities and thus 
underinvestment by overconfident CEOs should be less important; therefore, we would naturally 
expect weaker results. Nevertheless, if we still find a positive relation between CEO 
overconfidence and the value of cash, then stock returns and self-attribution are less likely to drive 
our results. Untabulated results, although weaker, confirm our previous findings and 
interpretations.22 
                                                          
22 The issue of reverse causality, or endogeneity more broadly, is very important as both observable and unobservable 
characteristics could be selection criteria when hiring CEOs. Although we perform several robustness analyses, it is 
rather hard to identify all of them ex-ante and control for them. Nevertheless, endogeneity does not seem to affect our 
main conclusions. For instance, if a board chooses an overconfident CEO especially during periods of high stock 
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4.  Additional Results 
4.1  Costly External Finance and Overinvestment Hypotheses 
From a theoretical perspective, the availability of internal funds, and the tension between 
investment returns and perceived financing costs determine whether overconfident CEOs will tend 
to overinvest or underinvest (Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Malmendier et al. (2011)). 
Overconfident CEOs will overinvest when they have more than sufficient internal funds. If internal 
financing is insufficient, overconfident CEOs tap external financing and overinvest when the 
overestimated investment returns are larger than the perceived financing costs. This is more likely 
when the firm is also externally financially unconstrained because the (perceived) financing cost 
would be lower. In contrast, if internal financing is insufficient and the overestimated investment 
returns are larger than the perceived financing costs, then overconfident CEOs may underinvest. 
This is more likely when the firm is also externally financially constrained because the (perceived) 
financing cost would be greater.  
Overall, the relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash depends on the 
availability of internal finance and the access to debt and equity markets; that is, it depends on 
firms’ internal and external financial constraint status. Therefore, considering firm’s financial 
constraint status allows us to explicitly examine the validity of the two hypotheses. Particularly, 
underinvestment is more likely when the firm has scarce resources (i.e., it is financially 
constrained), whereas overinvestment is more likely when the firm has abundant resources (i.e., it 
is financially unconstrained). Accordingly, under the costly external financing hypothesis a 
positive relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash should concentrate among 
                                                          
returns, it should be aware of the potential overinvestment / underinvestment effects that this behavioral bias may 
cause across the tenure of the CEO, and consider steps to explicitly address them.  
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financially constrained firms, whereas under the overinvestment hypothesis a negative relation 
should prevail among financially unconstrained firms.  
As it is common in the literature, we use several measures to separate firms based on their 
financial constraint status. We use excess cash and dividend policy to classify firms as internally 
financially constrained/unconstrained and debt rating and size-age (SA) index of Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) to classify firms as externally financially constrained/unconstrained.  
Regarding internal financial constraint status, we estimate excess cash using Fama-McBeth 
regressions of model 1 of Table 4 in Opler et al. (1999). Then, we use the residuals to estimate the 
financial constraint status of our sample firms. A firm is classified as financially constrained in 
year t when the residual value is above the sample median in that year, and unconstrained 
otherwise. Excess cash with a value greater than the median indicates the availability of cheap 
internal financing while less than the median excess cash highlights the importance of other 
costlier financing means (e.g. debt or equity financing).  
In addition, we use a firm’s dividend policy. Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that unconstrained 
firms are relatively more likely to have higher dividend payments, while constrained firms are 
relatively less likely to pay dividends. Therefore, a firm is classified as financially constrained in 
year t when it does not pay dividends in that year, and unconstrained otherwise (for a similar 
approach, see also, Denis and Sibilkov (2010)). 
Based on these measures, we define a firm as being internally financially constrained 
(unconstrained) when both excess cash and dividend payer proxies indicate that the firm is 
financially constrained (unconstrained).  
Concerning external financial constraint status, we focus on the existence of a credit rating 
that is higher than the investment grade threshold. We classify firms with positive debt outstanding 
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in a given year into the high financially constrained group in that year if the firm has either no 
credit rating information or its long-term debt is associated with a speculative grade rating in 
Compustat for that year. Firms with no debt outstanding and firms with investment grade ratings 
are classified as low financially constrained. Investment grade rating allows firms to access the 
public debt market at a lower cost. Non-rated firms and firms with speculative grade ratings have 
less available financing options relative to firms with investment grade ratings. The empirical 
literature provides ample evidence that rated firms are less constrained than non-rated ones, and 
higher ratings allow a firm to increase its financing options, such as the access to the commercial 
paper market (see, e.g., Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Kisgen (2007)).  
In addition, we use the SA index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010). The authors provide a critical 
analysis of widely used financial constraint measures. They categorize financial constraints with 
detailed qualitative information from financial filings and relate their qualitative measure to 
quantitative factors using order logit regressions. Among the different factors, age and size are 
particularly useful in predicting financial constraint levels. We use the size-age equation provided 
by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) to calculate the financial constraint level of our sample firm for each 
year (see Appendix A for detailed description). A firm is classified as financially constrained in 
year t when the SA index is above the sample median in that year (these are generally smaller and 
younger firms), and unconstrained otherwise. Beck et al. (2006), using the World Business 
Environment Survey, illustrate that smaller and younger firms have relatively lower access to 
external finance. 
Based on these measures, we define a firm as being externally financially constrained 
(unconstrained) when both debt rating and SA index proxies indicate that the firm is financially 
constrained (unconstrained).    
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Table 11 reports the results by financial constraint status. Panel A tests the underinvestment 
hypothesis (i.e., we use the subsample of firms that are classified as being financially constrained). 
When we focus on internal financial constraint status (specifications (1) and (2)), we do not find 
any relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash. Nevertheless, when we 
concentrate on both internally and externally financially constrained firms (specifications (3) and 
(4)), the results show a strong positive relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash 
(p<0.01 and p<0.01, respectively). These findings corroborate the costly external finance 
hypothesis because such firms are more likely to underinvest. 
Panel B tests the overinvestment hypothesis (i.e., we use financially unconstrained firms). 
Among the internally financially unconstrained firms (specifications (1) and (2)) the results show 
no relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash. When further conditioning the 
sample to externally financially unconstrained firms (specifications (3) and (4)), however, the 
results show a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash (p<0.10 and 
p<0.05, respectively), consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. Apparently, adding the 
external financial constraint status increases the power of the analysis, implying that, on average, 
overconfident CEOs perceive financing costs as lower than the overestimated investment returns, 
resulting in overinvestment. 
[Please Insert Table 11 About Here] 
 
4.2     Costly External Finance Hypothesis and Growth Opportunities 
Although the findings thus far show that additional cash is more valuable among financially 
constrained firms because it alleviates underinvestment, an interesting question is whether these 
findings are driven by firms that exhibit certain characteristics. Galasso and Simcoe (2011) argue 
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that overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the probability of failure, are more likely to innovate. 
In addition, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) find that overconfident CEOs are better in exploiting R&D 
growth opportunities to create firm value. Therefore, among firms that exhibit R&D growth 
opportunities, underinvestment should be more painful for shareholders. In addition, if cash 
alleviates underinvestment problems, then there must be also a more positive relation between 
CEO overconfidence and the value of cash.  
In this section, we test this conjecture using the sub-sample of internally financially 
constrained firms (specifications (1) and (2) of Table 11).23 A firm-level measure of R&D growth 
opportunities complicates the analysis because R&D growth opportunities and cash policy might 
be endogenously related. Hence, for identification purposes we require an approach that enables 
the exogenous measurement of R&D growth opportunities. We therefore measure growth 
opportunities at the industry level using the 48-industry classification developed by Fama and 
French (1997). In addition, to further alleviate endogeneity concerns, we also consider a lead of 
one year with respect to the measurement of firm’s cash holding in our valuation regressions.  
More specifically, in a given year, we consider all firms in the Compustat universe and 
classify industries into high and low growth opportunities using as a growth measure R&D 
expenses. A given industry is considered to have high (low) growth opportunities in year t when 
the aggregate industry R&D expenses in year t+1 to aggregate industry total assets at the beginning 
of the period is above (below) the median in that year. We scale the industry R&D expenses by 
the aggregate total assets in order to control for the size of the industry. 
Table 12 presents the results. As expected, the positive relation between CEO 
overconfidence and the value of cash concentrates among financially constrained firms that exhibit 
                                                          
23 Using the subsample of firms that are both internally and externally financially constrained reduces the sample 
dramatically which does not allow to draw any useful inferences. 
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high R&D growth opportunities. Depending on the severity of firm’s financial constraints and the 
availability of R&D growth opportunities, having overconfident CEO on board increases the value 
of $1.00 cash holding by an additional amount of $0.74 relative to a firm run by a rational CEO.  
[Please Insert Table 12 About Here] 
 
5.  Conclusion 
This study investigates the relation between CEO overconfidence and the value of cash. 
Overconfident CEOs are commonly known to believe that their firms are undervalued by the 
market, thus perceiving external financing as unduly costly. As a result, they rely more on internal 
funds to finance their investment projects. When internal funds, however, are not sufficient, 
overconfident CEOs may underinvest and additional cash should be valuable since it allows the 
firm to alleviate its underinvestment problem. Consistent with the costly external finance 
hypothesis (underinvestment channel), CEO overconfidence affects positively the value of cash 
holdings. This effect is more pronounced within financially constrained firms and within firms that 
exhibit high R&D growth opportunities. These firms are more likely to suffer from the 
underinvestment problem. The results hold to a battery of robustness tests and alternative 
explanations. Collectively, the results support the view that cash saving is a value-increasing 
response in firms with overconfident CEOs, as additional cash alleviates the underinvestment 
problem and allows the firm to further deplete its investment opportunity set. 
Our findings have important implications on our understanding of corporate investment 
policies. Many studies show that investments depend on various frictions that generate financial 
constraints for firms. We find that the overconfidence nature of CEOs affects the value of cash 
beyond the effects of traditional financial constraint proxies. This implies that due to high 
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perceived external financing cost, the average overconfident CEO is more financially constrained 
than the average rational CEO, resulting in underinvestment. Thus, CEO overconfidence is an 
additional explanation for corporate investment distortions, particularly underinvestment. 
In addition, our findings have important implications for corporate governance policies and 
more specifically on the role of boards in selecting, incentivizing, and monitoring CEOs. 
Overconfident CEOs, unlike agency-based explanations, unconsciously disregard shareholders’ 
interests since they may underinvest when their firms lack internal resources and exhibit high 
growth opportunities. Therefore, traditional equity-based-compensation is unlikely to affect their 
decision making and alleviate underinvestment. As a result, when selecting an overconfident CEO, 
effective boards, for instance, (i) may take measures to improve active monitoring of a firm’s 
internal resources policy and (ii) appoint (rational) directors with financial expertise (e.g. bankers) 
that may facilitate external financing when the firm is financially constrained.   
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Appendix A 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
All names within square brackets refer to Compustat item names. All dollar values are adjusted to 2013 dollars by the 
consumer price index. 
 
Dependent Variable 
Excess returnt:  Buy-and-hold excess stock return over the calendar year defined as ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑚) −
∏(1 + 𝑅𝑝,𝑚), where Ri,m and Rp,m are the return for firm i and the return of the benchmark 
portfolio for month m in year t. Benchmark portfolios are the twenty-five Fama-French 
value-weighted portfolios based on size and book-to-market. 
 
Independent Variables 
ΔCt:  Change in cash holdings [CHE] in year t (i.e., CHEt – CHEt-1), scaled by market value of 
equity [PRCC x CSHO] in year t–1. 
Overconfidentt:  Longholder measure of CEO overconfidence. Indicator variable that equals 1 during the 
tenure of a CEO when at least once during the period 2006-2013, holds an option until the 
year of expiration, even though the stock option is at least 40% in-the-money entering its 
final year, and 0 otherwise. CEOs that never exercise options do not reveal beliefs and, 
thus, longholder is set to missing. 
Low Confidencet:  Based on longholder measure of CEO overconfidence. Indicator variable that equals 1 
during the tenure of a CEO when at least once during the period 2006-2013, holds an option 
until the year of expiration, and the stock option is below 66.22% in-the-money entering 
its final year, and 0 otherwise. The threshold of 66.22% is the 25th percentile in-the-money 
option value of the sample. CEOs that never exercise options do not reveal beliefs and, 
thus, low confidence is set to missing. 
High Confidencet:  Based on longholder measure of CEO overconfidence. Indicator variable that equals 1 
during the tenure of a CEO when at least once during the period 2006-2013, holds an option 
until the year of expiration, and the stock option is greater or equal to 66.22% in-the-money 
entering its final year, and 0 otherwise. The threshold of 66.22% is the 25th percentile in-
the-money option value of the sample. CEOs that never exercise options do not reveal 
beliefs and, thus, high confidence is set to missing. 
Overconfident (Press)t:  Press-based measure of CEO overconfidence. Indicator variable that equals 1 when the 
number of “confident” articles for a CEO in Factiva is greater than the number of 
“cautious” articles, and 0 otherwise. 
Overconfident (Gender)t:  Gender-based measure of executive overconfidence. Indicator variable that equals 1 when 
the CEO or the CFO of the firm is male. We identify gender, CEO and CFO using 
ExecuComp’s classification (data item GENDER = MALE; CEOANN = CEO; and 
TITLEANN contains any of the following words: CFO, chief financial officer, treasurer, 
controller, finance, and vice-president finance, respectively). 
ΔEt:  Change in earnings in year t, scaled by market value of equity in year t–1. Earnings are 
calculated as earnings before extraordinary items [IB] plus interest [XINT], deferred tax 
credits [TXDI], and investment tax credits [ITCI]. 
ΔNAt:  Change in net assets in year t, scaled by market value of equity in year t–1. Net assets is 
total assets [AT] minus cash holdings [CHE]. 
ΔRDt:  Change in research and development expenses [XRD] in year t, scaled by market value of 
equity in year t–1. 
ΔIt:  Change in interest expenses [XINT] in year t, scaled by market value of equity in year t–
1. 
ΔDt:    Change in dividends [DVC] in year t, scaled by market value of equity in year t–1. 
Ct–1:    Lagged cash holdings, scaled by market value of equity in year t–1. 
Lt:  Market leverage in year t calculated as the ratio of total debt to market value of the firm. 
Total debt is the sum of long-term debt [DLTT] and debt in current liabilities [DLC]. 
Market value of the firm is calculated as total debt plus market value of equity.  
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NFt:  Net financing in year t calculated as total equity issuance [SSTK] minus repurchases 
[PRSTKC] plus debt issuance [DLTIS] minus debt redemption [DLTR]. 
CEO age:   The age of the CEO as reported in ExecuComp. 
Vega/TC:  The change in the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a one percentage change in the 
annualized standard deviation of stock returns at the end of the fiscal year, scaled by the 
CEO’s total compensation.  
Delta/TC:  The change in the dollar value of the CEO wealth for a one percentage point change in 
stock price at the end of the fiscal year, scaled by the CEO’s total compensation. 
 
Measures of Internal Financial Constraint Status 
Excess cash:  A firm is classified as highly financially constrained in year t when the residual of the Opler 
et al. (1999) corporate cash model 1 of Table 4 is above the sample median in that year, 
and low financially constrained otherwise.   
Dividend payers:  A firm is classified as highly financially constrained in year t when it does not pay 
dividends in that year [DVC], and low financially constrained otherwise. 
 
Measures of External Financial Constraint Status 
Debt rating:  A given firm with debt outstanding is classified as highly financially constrained in year t 
when either it is unrated or its debt has a non-investment grade rating. Firms with no debt 
outstanding and with investment grade ratings are classified in the low financially 
constraint group. 
SA index:  The size-age index of Hadlock and Pierce (2010) computed using the following equation: 
–0.737 Size + 0.043 Size2 – 0.040 Age, where Size is the log of inflation adjusted (to 2004) 
book assets, and Age is the number of years the firm has been on Compustat with a non-
missing stock price. Size is replaced with log ($4.5 billion) and Age with 37 years if the 
actual values exceed these thresholds. A firm is classified as highly financially constrained 
in year t when the SA index is above the sample median in that year, and low financially 
constrained otherwise. 
 
Measure of R&D Growth Opportunities 
Industry R&D expenses: A given Fama-French 48-industry has high (low) growth opportunities in year t when the 
aggregate industry R&D expenses [XRD] in year t+1 to aggregate industry total assets at 
the beginning of the period is above (below) the sample median in that year. The estimation 
is based on all Compustat firms before applying sample restrictions. 
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Appendix B 
 Value of Cash – Compustat versus ExecuComp Sample 
This table reports OLS regressions to estimate the value of cash based on specification (2) in Table II of Faulkender and Wang (2006). To be included in the sample, 
firms are required to belong in the S&P 1500 index with available observations in the ExecuComp, CRSP, and Compustat databases. In addition, we exclude firm-
years with market value of equity less than 25 million in constant 2013 dollars, negative sales, negative net assets, negative dividends, negative capital expenditures 
and firms from the financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) industries. The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the 
Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. Δ indicates the change from the previous year. Ct is cash holding, Et is 
earnings before interest and extraordinary items, NAt is total assets minus cash holdings, RDt is research and development expenses, It is interest expenses, Dt is 
common dividends, Lt is market leverage, and NFt is net financing. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Panel A reports estimates using the period (1) 1972-
2001 (i.e., sample period in Faulkender and Wang 2006); (2) 1993-2013 using Compustat data; (3) 1993-2013 using ExecuComp data, and (4) 1993-2013 using 
ExecuComp data with non-missing information about CEO overconfidence. Panel B uses the mean (in-sample for each regression) levels of Ct-1 and Lt, to compute 
the marginal value of $1 in cash for the average firm for the above four different samples. 
 
Panel A. OLS Regressions 
 (1) 
Compustat 
Sample Period: 1972-2001 
 
(2) 
Compustat 
Sample Period: 1993-2013 
(3) 
ExecuComp 
Sample Period: 1993-2013 
(4) 
ExecuComp & CEO 
Overconfidence 
Sample Period: 1993-2013 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. Coef. t-stat t-stat Coef. t-stat 
ΔCt 1.230*** 34.36 1.576*** 34.73 1.703*** 27.24 1.638*** 19.77 
ΔEt 0.696*** 37.74 0.564*** 28.97 0.466*** 16.87 0.466*** 13.42 
ΔNAt 0.104*** 12.92 0.178*** 16.55 0.214*** 14.65 0.201*** 10.36 
ΔRDt 0.333** 2.15 -0.007 -0.04 0.317 1.15 0.517 1.28 
ΔIt -1.924*** -19.22 -2.453*** -13.62 -2.594*** -8.31 -2.527*** -5.20 
ΔDt 2.464*** 11.77 0.991*** 4.05 0.443 1.38 0.161 0.43 
Ct-1 0.341*** 23.72 0.295*** 19.44 0.299*** 13.74 0.247*** 9.26 
Lt -0.309*** -35.47 -0.311*** -30.13 -0.351*** -24.05 -0.314*** -16.97 
NFt 0.048*** 3.42 -0.073 -3.69 -0.149*** -4.90 -0.151** -3.77 
ΔCt  Ct-1  -0.559*** -8.43 -0.907*** -10.73 -0.718*** -5.14 -0.822*** -4.44 
ΔCt  Lt  -1.057*** -14.64 -1.035*** -10.71 -1.465*** -9.28 -1.199*** -5.64 
Intercept 0.038*** 12.12 0.016*** 4.38 0.037*** 8.57 0.062***      10.91 
Adjusted R² 0.142  0.138  0.160  0.157  
Observations 67,887  51,776  22,667  12,105  
 
Panel B. The Marginal Value of Cash for the Average Firms  
Sample Means         
Ct-1 0.142  0.151  0.124  0.132  
Lt 0.249  0.186  0.188  0.178  
Value of $1 0.89  1.25  1.34        1.32  
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Table 1 
 
Sample Distribution by Year 
 
This table displays the yearly breakdown of the number and the proportion of overconfident and rational CEO firm-
year observations. The sample consists of 12,105 firm-year observations that cover the period 1993-2013. To be 
included in the sample, firms are required to belong in the S&P 1500 index with available observations in the 
ExecuComp, CRSP, and Compustat databases. In addition, we exclude firm-years with market value of equity less 
than 25 million in constant 2013 dollars, negative sales, negative net assets, negative dividends, negative capital 
expenditures and firms from the financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) industries. CEO 
overconfidence is based on a longholder measure. Longholder measure definition is in Appendix A.  
 
 
Year Total 
Overconfident  High-Confident Rational  
Number 
Proportion 
(%) 
Number 
Proportion 
(%) 
Number 
Proportion 
(%) 
1993 66 19 28.79 15 22.73 47 71.21 
1994 121 33 27.27 23 19.01 88 72.73 
1995 139 36 25.90 27 19.42 103 74.10 
1996 163 42 25.77 32 19.63 121 74.23 
1997 187 49 26.20 38 20.32 138 73.80 
1998 243 70 28.81 52 21.40 173 71.19 
1999 282 87 30.85 65 23.05 195 69.15 
2000 363 113 31.13 87 23.97 250 68.87 
2001 422 116 27.49 91 21.56 306 72.51 
2002 489 135 27.61 101 20.65 354 72.39 
2003 588 165 28.06 122 20.75 423 71.94 
2004 682 192 28.15 141 20.67 490 71.85 
2005 779 232 29.78 173 22.21 547 70.22 
2006 851 244 28.67 185 21.74 607 71.33 
2007 1,038 294 28.32 221 21.29 744 71.68 
2008 1,020 280 27.45 210 20.59 740 72.55 
2009 953 260 27.28 197 20.67 693 72.72 
2010 984 266 27.03 199 20.22 718 72.97 
2011 979 271 27.68 204 20.84 708 72.32 
2012 912 241 26.43 181 19.85 671 73.57 
2013 844 211 25.00 155 18.36 633 75.00 
Total 12,105 3,356 27.72 2,519 20.81 8,749 72.28 
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Table 2 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
This table displays summary statistics on firm and CEO characteristics for firms managed by overconfident and 
rational CEOs. The sample consists of 12,105 firm-year observations that cover the period 1993-2013. To be included 
in the sample, firms are required to belong in the S&P 1500 index with available observations in the ExecuComp, 
CRSP, and Compustat databases. In addition, we exclude firm-years with market value of equity less than 25 million 
in constant 2013 dollars, negative sales, negative net assets, negative dividends, negative capital expenditures and 
firms from the financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) industries. Firm characteristics include total 
assets, sales, percentage change in sales, tobin’s q, cash, leverage, profitability, capital expenditures, cash acquisitions, 
and R&D expenses. All dollar values are adjusted to 2013 dollars using the consumer price index. Cash, leverage, 
profitability, capital expenditures, cash acquisitions, and R&D expenses are deflated by total assets. CEO 
characteristics include age, vega and delta. Vega and delta are deflated by CEO’s total compensation. T-tests 
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are conducted to test for differences between means (medians) for firms with 
overconfident vs. rational CEOs. CEO overconfidence is based on a longholder measure. *** and ** denote 
statistically significant difference at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
 
 All Sample Overconfident  Rational 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Firm Characteristics       
Total assets ($) 7,726.10 1,671.14 9,815.29*** 1,397.97*** 6,924.72 1,765.28 
Sales ($) 6,943.10 1,634.85 6,259.62** 1,362.27*** 7,205.28 1,763.94 
% ΔSales  0.063 0.057 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.072 0.064 
Q 2.038 1.625 1.879*** 1.433*** 2.099 1.705 
Cash   0.165 0.100 0.196*** 0.137*** 0.153 0.089 
Leverage 0.178 0.133 0.210*** 0.149*** 0.166 0.128 
Profitability 0.148 0.141 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.159 0.151 
Capital expenditures 0.066 0.045 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.069 0.047 
Cash acquisitions 0.037 0.002 0.031*** 0.000*** 0.039 0.002 
R&D expenses 0.063 0.003 0.091*** 0.007*** 0.053 0.001 
       
CEO Characteristics       
CEO age 54.928 55.000 54.924 55.000 54.930 55.000 
Vega / TC 0.028 0.019 0.029 0.019 0.028 0.019 
Delta / TC 0.211 0.067 0.193** 0.054*** 0.217 0.072 
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Table 3 
 
CEO Overconfidence and the Value of Cash 
 
This table reports OLS regressions to estimate the value of cash using the Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach. The 
sample consists of 12,105 firm-year observations and covers the period 1993-2013. To be included in the sample, 
firms are required to belong in the S&P 1500 index with available observations in the ExecuComp, CRSP, and 
Compustat databases. In addition, we exclude firm-years with market value of equity less than 25 million in constant 
2013 dollars, negative sales, negative net assets, negative dividends, negative capital expenditures and firms from the 
financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 4900-4999) industries. The dependent variable is the annual excess return 
of the firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. 
CEO overconfidence, low and high confidence are based on a longholder measure (see Appendix A). Δ indicates the 
change from the previous year. Ct is cash holding, Et is earnings before interest and extraordinary items, NAt is total 
assets minus cash holdings, RDt is research and development expenses, It is interest expenses, Dt is common dividends, 
Lt is market leverage, and NFt is net financing. TC is the CEO’s total compensation in a given year. Delta and Vega 
are the stock price sensitivity and the stock return volatility sensitivity of the CEO’s incentive compensation, 
respectively. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel B uses the 
mean (in-sample for each regression) levels of Ct-1, Lt, Overconfidentt, CEO age, Delta/TC, Vega/TC, low confidence 
and high confidence to compute the marginal value of $1 in cash for the average firm in the full sample, and conditional 
on the CEO being overconfident (highly confident) or not. 
 
 Panel A. OLS Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
ΔCt 1.547*** 18.04 1.997*** 5.92 1.987*** 5.92 
Overconfidentt -0.047*** -5.93 -0.045*** -5.78   
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.285*** 2.89 0.279*** 2.85   
Low confidencet     -0.044*** -3.56 
ΔCt  Low confidencet     0.187 1.43 
High confidencet     -0.046*** -5.17 
ΔCt  High confidencet     0.311*** 2.87 
ΔEt 0.465*** 13.40 0.461*** 13.27 0.604*** 10.08 
ΔNAt 0.203*** 10.50 0.203*** 10.53 0.210*** 8.02 
ΔRDt 0.934 2.36 0.876** 2.22 0.772 1.29 
ΔIt -2.354*** -4.95 -2.343*** -4.94 -3.035*** -4.83 
ΔDt 0.419 1.11 0.456 1.22 0.531 1.25 
NFt -0.144*** -3.71 -0.153*** -3.96 -0.148*** -2.70 
Ct-1 0.394*** 13.00 0.385*** 12.79 0.491*** 10.37 
Lt -0.404*** -19.05 -0.392*** -18.29 -0.437*** -16.53 
ΔCt  Ct-1  -0.812*** -4.38 -0.797*** -4.33 -0.783*** -3.06 
ΔCt  Lt  -1.312*** -6.56 -1.252*** -6.15 -1.880*** -6.64 
CEO age   -0.001 -1.09 -0.001 -1.09 
ΔCt x CEO age   -0.009 -1.44 -0.008 -1.39 
Vega/TC   -0.675*** -6.30 -0.673*** -6.28 
ΔCt  (Vega/TC)   -0.399 -0.22 -0.433 -0.24 
Delta/TC   0.040*** 4.78 0.040*** 4.77 
ΔCt  (Delta/TC)   0.051 0.28 0.060 0.33 
Intercept 0.070*** 2.76 0.104*** 2.91 0.103 2.91 
       
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R² 0.200  0.205  0.205  
Observations 12,105  12,105  12,105  
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
 Panel B. The Marginal Value of Cash for the Average Firm 
Sample Means 
 Ct-1 0.132  0.132  0.132  
 Lt 0.178  0.178  0.178  
 Overconfidentt 0.277  0.277    
 CEO age   54.928  54.928  
 Vega/TC   0.028  0.028  
 Delta/TC   0.211  0.211  
 Low confidencet     0.069  
 High confidencet     0.208  
Value of $1 
 Full sample 1.29  1.25  1.29  
 Overconfidentt 1.49  1.45    
 High confidencet     1.54  
 Rationalt 1.21  1.17  1.23  
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Table 4 
 
Controlling for Firm Fixed Effects 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 after controlling for firm fixed-effects. 
The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) twenty-five 
value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low and high confidence are based on a 
longholder measure. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
firm clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
ΔCt 1.865*** 
(5.59) 
1.864*** 
(5.59) 
Overconfidentt -0.031 
(-1.14) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.206** 
(2.10) 
 
Low confidencet  -0.027 
(-0.80) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  0.182 
(1.42) 
High confidencet  -0.032 
(-1.00) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  0.214*** 
(1.98) 
   
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.269 0.269 
Observations 12,105 12,105 
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Table 5 
 
Propensity Score Matching 
 
Panel A presents for each control variable in Table 3 the difference-in-means between the overconfident and rational 
CEO subsamples together with the corresponding t-statistics. The unmatched sample corresponds to the original 
sample. The matched sample is the sample based on CEO overconfidence propensity score matching. Panel B presents 
coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 using the matched sample. The dependent variable is the 
annual excess return of the firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-
market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low and high confidence are based on a longholder measure. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Difference-in-Means of Control Variables Between the Overconfident and Rational CEO Subsamples 
 Unmatched Sample Matched Sample 
 Difference-in-Means t-stat Difference-in-Means t-stat 
ΔCt 0.005*** 2.80 0.000 0.18 
ΔEt -0.001       -0.31 0.001 0.34 
ΔNAt 0.049*** 8.83 0.001 0.14 
ΔRDt 0.001*** 4.22 -0.000 -0.07 
ΔIt 0.001*** 3.09 0.000 0.93 
ΔDt 0.001*** 3.97 -0.000 -0.11 
Ct-1 -0.075*** -24.04 -0.001 -0.21 
Lt -0.044*** -12.21 0.001 0.25 
NFt 0.003   1.14 0.000 0.16 
CEO age 0.006 0.04 -0.225 -1.25 
Vega/TC -0.001 -1.16 0.001* 1.88 
Delta/TC 0.025**   2.31 0.003 0.24 
     
Observations     
All sample 12,105  6,712  
Overconfident  3,356  3,356  
Rational 8,749  3,356  
 
Panel B: CEO Overconfidence and the Value of Cash: Matched Sample 
 (1) (2) 
ΔCt 1.657*** 
(4.23) 
1.650*** 
(4.23) 
Overconfidentt -0.049*** 
(-5.45) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.307*** 
(2.81) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.046*** 
(-3.44) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.250* 
(1.75) 
High confidencet  
-0.049*** 
(-5.07) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
0.323*** 
(2.73) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.239 0.239 
Observations 6,712 6,712 
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Table 6 
 
Alternative Measures of CEO Overconfidence 
 
This table reports OLS regressions to estimate the value of cash using the Faulkender and Wang (2006) approach as 
per specification (2) of Table 3. To be included in the sample, firms are required to belong in the S&P 1500 index 
with available observations in the ExecuComp, CRSP, and Compustat databases. In addition, we exclude firm-year 
observations with market value of equity less than 25 million in constant 2009 dollars, negative sales, negative net 
assets, negative dividends, negative capital expenditures and firms from the financial (SIC 6000-6999) and utility (SIC 
4900-4999) industries. The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the Fama and French 
(1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. Overconfidence is based on a press measure 
(period 1992-2009) and a gender measure (period 1993-2013). Δ indicates the change from the previous year. Ct is 
cash holding. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) 
ΔCt 2.514*** 
(8.15) 
2.412*** 
(7.76) 
Overconfident (Press)t -0.022** 
(-2.42) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfident (Press)t 0.221** 
(1.97) 
 
Overconfident (Gender)t  
0.003 
(0.26) 
ΔCt  Overconfident (Gender)t  
0.248* 
(1.81) 
   
Year fixed effects      Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects      Yes Yes 
Control variables      Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.219 
Observations 16,902 15,967 
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Table 7 
 
Controlling for Corporate Governance 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 after controlling for the quality of the 
firm’s corporate governance. The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the Fama and 
French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low and high 
confidence are based on a longholder measure (See Appendix A). Specifications (1) and (2) include Good governance 
as an indicator variable that equals 1 when the Bebchuk et al. (2009) Entrenchment Index from RiskMetrics belongs 
in the bottom tercile of the index. The index is the sum of binary variables concerning the following provisions: 1) 
classified boards; 2) limitations to shareholders’ ability to amend the bylaws; 3) supermajority voting for business 
combinations; 4) supermajority requirements for charter amendments; 5) poison pills; and 6) golden parachutes. 
Specifications (3) and (4) control for CEO/Chairman duality using an indicator variable that equals to 1 when the CEO 
of the firm is also the chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise. Specifications (5) and (6) control for the percentage of 
institutional holdings by dedicated investors (DED), the percentage of institutional holdings by quasi indexers 
investors (QIX), and the percentage of institutional holdings by transient investors (TRA). Information about the type 
of institutional investors is from Brian Bushee’s website. For the sake of brevity, the coefficient estimates of the 
control variables are not reported. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the corresponding coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Entrenchment Index CEO/Chairman Duality  Institutional Ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔCt 2.083*** 
(5.06) 
2.077*** 
(5.09) 
2.075*** 
(5.90) 
2.064*** 
(5.90) 
1.642*** 
(4.26) 
1.643*** 
(4.26) 
Overconfidentt -0.051*** 
(-5.64) 
 -0.046*** 
(-5.79) 
 -0.048*** 
(-5.96) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.277** 
(2.42) 
 0.273*** 
(2.78) 
 0.252*** 
(2.69) 
 
Low confidencet  -0.052*** 
(-3.77) 
 -0.044*** 
(-3.57) 
 -0.039*** 
(-3.26) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  0.213 
(1.43) 
 0.188 
(1.47) 
 0.204 
(1.62) 
High confidencet  -0.050*** 
(-4.91) 
 -0.046*** 
(-5.17) 
 -0.051*** 
(-5.49) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  0.297** 
(2.38) 
 0.302*** 
(2.78) 
 0.266** 
(2.50) 
Good governancet -0.012 
(-1.55) 
-0.012 
(-1.55) 
    
ΔCt  Good governancet 0.279** 
(2.26) 
0.281** 
(2.28) 
    
Dualityt   0.001 
(0.17) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
  
ΔCt  Dualityt   0.149 
(1.52) 
0.146 
(1.50) 
  
DEDt     0.064 
(1.42) 
0.066 
(1.46) 
ΔCt  DEDt     0.955 
(1.64) 
0.939 
(1.60) 
QIXt     -0.167*** 
(-7.11) 
-0.167*** 
(-7.09) 
ΔCt  QIXt     -0.544* 
(-1.95) 
-0.551** 
(-1.96) 
TRAt     0.623*** 
(16.94) 
0.624*** 
(16.98) 
ΔCt  TRAt     0.647* 
(1.70) 
0.638* 
(1.67) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.203 0.203 0.206 0.205 0.230 0.230 
Observations 9,336 9,336 12,105 12,105 11,614 11,614 
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Table 8 
 
Controlling for Cash Regimes 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 after controlling for cash regimes. The 
dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value 
weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low and high confidence are based on a longholder 
measure. Following Halford et al. (2017), cash regimes are defined using actual firm behaviors. Columns (1) and (2) 
restrict the sample to firms classified in the raising cash regime (i.e., firms that issue equity which is greater than 3% 
of the market value of equity and do not make dividend payments). Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to firms 
classified in the distributing cash regime (i.e., firms that distribute cash and do not issue equity). Variable definitions 
are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. T-statistics are reported 
within brackets below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Raising Cash Regime Distributing Cash Regime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ΔCt 2.061** 
(2.42) 
2.066** 
(2.41) 
1.876*** 
(4.17) 
1.885*** 
(4.14) 
Overconfidentt -0.085* 
(-1.90) 
 -0.047*** 
(-5.59) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.633*** 
(2.49) 
 0.183 
(1.36) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.078 
(-1.11) 
 -0.057*** 
(-4.63) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.660** 
(2.18) 
 0.177 
(1.13) 
High confidencet  
-0.086* 
(-1.73) 
 -0.044*** 
(-4.41) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
0.627** 
(2.23) 
 0.188 
(1.18) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.367 0.182 0.182 
Observations 534 534 8,382 8,382 
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Table 9 
 
Alternative Explanations for Late Option Exercisers 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 after controlling for alternative 
explanations for late option exercisers. The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the 
Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low 
and high confidence are based on a longholder measure (see Appendix A). In Panel A, specifications (1) and (2) 
control for CEO managerial ability using the measure developed by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (DLM) (2012), 
specifications (3) and (4) control for the age the individual became first CEO and specifications (5) and (6) control for 
stock returns at year t+1. For the sake of brevity, the coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported. In 
Panel B, specifications (1) and (2) control for the probability of default as a proxy for credit risk. The probability of 
default is calculated based on the Merton’s (1974) model of credit risk and the simplified “naive” approach suggested 
by Bharath and Shumway (2008). Specifications (3) and (4) include the interest coverage ratio as an inverse proxy for 
credit risk. Interest coverage ratio is calculated as pretax income plus depreciation and amortization plus interest 
expenses, scaled by interest expenses. The measure is set to missing value when interest expenses are zero or missing. 
The coefficient estimate of both the interest coverage ratio and the interaction term with change in cash holdings are 
multiplied by 100. Specifications (5) and (6) include stock return volatility as a proxy for total risk. Stock return 
volatility is measured using weakly returns during the entire fiscal year. We require at least 26 weakly returns during 
the year. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm 
clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Managerial Ability 
 
Demerjian, Lev, McVay 
(DLM) (2012) 
CEO Age at First 
Office 
Expectations about Strong Future 
Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔCt 2.096*** 
(6.19) 
2.086*** 
(6.20) 
1.922*** 
(5.17) 
1.914*** 
(5.17) 
1.993*** 
(5.86) 
1.984*** 
(5.86) 
Overconfidentt -0.048*** 
(-6.10) 
 -0.047*** 
(-5.78) 
 -0.050*** 
(-6.17) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.283*** 
(2.85) 
 0.284*** 
(2.83) 
 0.251** 
(2.52) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.046*** 
(-3.68) 
 
-0.043*** 
(-3.45) 
 -0.047*** 
(-3.71) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.194 
(1.48) 
 
0.197 
(1.50) 
 0.174 
(1.34) 
High confidencet  
-0.049*** 
(-5.47) 
 
-0.047*** 
(-5.21) 
 -0.051*** 
(-5.57) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
0.315*** 
(2.86) 
 
0.315*** 
(2.83) 
 0.277** 
(2.51) 
DLMt 0.068*** 
(2.71) 
0.068*** 
(2.71) 
 
   
ΔCt  DLMt -0.034 
(-0.10) 
-0.028 
(-0.08) 
 
   
Age at first office 
 
 0.001 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
  
ΔCt  Age at first office  
 0.007 
(0.60) 
0.007 
(0.60) 
  
Returnt+1  
 
 
 -0.038*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.91) 
ΔCt  Returnt+1  
 
 
 -0.122* 
(-1.75) 
-0.121* 
(-1.74) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.208 0.204 0.204 0.208 0.208 
Observations 11,845 11,845 11,884 11,884 11,886 11,886 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Managerial Risk Tolerance 
 Probability of Default Interest Coverage Ratio Stock Return Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔCt 2.491*** 
(5.99) 
2.457*** 
(5.91) 
1.802*** 
(5.00) 
1.796*** 
(5.01) 
1.884*** 
(5.14) 
1.873*** 
(5.13) 
Overconfidentt -0.043*** 
(-4.49) 
 -0.042*** 
(-5.01) 
 
-0.044*** 
(-5.61) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.233** 
(1.96) 
 0.278*** 
(2.65) 
 
0.259*** 
(2.58) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.038*** 
(-2.74) 
 
-0.043*** 
(-3.23) 
 -0.043*** 
(-3.45) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.023 
(0.15) 
 
0.198 
(1.45) 
 0.163 
(1.22) 
High confidencet  
-0.045*** 
(-4.04) 
 
-0.042*** 
(-4.39) 
 -0.045*** 
(-5.03) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
0.315** 
(2.31) 
 
0.305*** 
(2.64) 
 0.292*** 
(2.66) 
Probability of defaultt -0.872*** 
(-3.07) 
-0.872*** 
(-3.07) 
  
 
 
ΔCt  Probability of defaultt -2.718 
(-1.03) 
-2.495 
(-0.94) 
  
 
 
Interest coveraget  
 -0.001*** 
(-3.95) 
-0.001*** 
(-3.95) 
 
 
ΔCt  Interest coveraget  
 0.001** 
(2.21) 
0.001** 
(2.21) 
 
 
Stock return volatilityt  
 
  
-0.084 
(-0.43) 
-0.085 
(0.44) 
ΔCt  Stock return volatilityt  
 
  
1.511 
(1.06) 
1.519*** 
(1.06) 
       
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.185 0.185 0.210 0.210 0.207 0.207 
Observations 8,034 8,034 10,620 10,620 12,090 12,090 
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Table 10 
 
Non-Random CEO-Firm Matching 
 
This table presents coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 by subsamples of CEO tenure. 
Specifications (1) and (2) require CEO tenure greater than 1 year, specifications (3) and (4) greater than 3 years, and 
specifications (5) and (6) greater than 5 years. In all specifications the dependent variable is the annual excess return 
of the firm relative to the Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. 
CEO overconfidence, low and high confidence are based on a longholder measure. For the sake of brevity, the 
coefficient estimates of the control variables are not reported. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the 
corresponding coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Tenure > 1 Year  Tenure > 3 Years Tenure > 5 Years 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔCt 2.017*** 
(5.71) 
2.005*** 
(5.72) 
1.975*** 
(4.93) 
1.943*** 
(4.88) 
2.105*** 
(4.44) 
2.059*** 
(4.43) 
Overconfidentt -0.047*** 
(-5.77) 
 -0.039*** 
(-4.39) 
 
-0.038*** 
(-3.78) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.283*** 
(2.81) 
 0.255** 
(2.24) 
 
0.306** 
(2.30) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.041*** 
(-3.24) 
 -0.028* 
(-1.95) 
 -0.033** 
(-2.06) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.176 
(1.34) 
 0.104 
(0.72) 
 0.003 
(0.02) 
High confidencet  
-0.048*** 
(-5.32) 
 -0.043*** 
(-4.29) 
 -0.040*** 
(-3.57) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
0.319*** 
(2.86) 
 0.307** 
(2.43) 
 0.412*** 
(2.88) 
       
Year fixed effects      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.205 0.211 0.211 0.212 0.213 
Observations 11,319 11,319 8,942 8,942 6,906 6,906 
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Table 11 
 
The Role of Financial Constraint Status 
This table presents coefficient estimates of specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3 after splitting firm-year observations 
based on their financial constraint status. The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the 
Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low 
and high confidence are based on a longholder measure. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Panel A 
refers to the costly external finance hypothesis. Panel B refers to the overinvestment hypothesis. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the corresponding 
coefficient estimate. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Costly External Finance 
Hypothesis 
Internally  
Financially Constrained  
Internally and Externally 
Financially Constrained 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ΔCt 2.954*** 
(3.43) 
2.957*** 
(3.42) 
0.996 
(0.81) 
0.924 
(0.75) 
Overconfidentt -0.031* 
(-1.79) 
 -0.019 
(-0.79) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt 0.347 
(1.46) 
 1.013*** 
(2.99) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.004 
(-0.14) 
 
0.043 
(1.05) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.344 
(0.90) 
 
1.001** 
(2.46) 
High confidencet  
-0.038** 
(-2.00) 
 
-0.034 
(-1.27) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
0.334 
(1.27) 
 
0.981*** 
(2.58) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.226 0.258 0.258 
Observations 3,017 3,017 1,385 1,385 
 
Panel B: Overinvestment 
Hypothesis 
Internally  
Financially Unconstrained  
Internally and Externally 
Financially Unconstrained 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ΔCt 1.743*** 
(2.59) 
1.711** 
(2.51) 
2.911*** 
(2.88) 
2.820*** 
(2.75) 
Overconfidentt -0.057*** 
(-3.70) 
 -0.054*** 
(-2.67) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt -0.050 
(-0.23) 
 -0.563* 
(-1.67) 
 
Low confidencet  
-0.080*** 
(-3.89) 
 
-0.057** 
(-2.26) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.085 
(0.34) 
 
-0.015 
(-0.03) 
High confidencet  
-0.047*** 
(-2.70) 
 
-0.053** 
(-2.35) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
-0.111 
(-0.43) 
 
-0.694** 
(-1.96) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.222 0.238 0.238 
Observations 2,824 2,824 1,466 1,466 
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Table 12 
 
Financial Constraint Status and Industry R&D Growth Opportunities 
 
This table uses the subsample of internally financially constrained firms and presents coefficient estimates of Panel A 
of Table 11 after splitting firm-year observations based on industry R&D growth opportunities. Specifications (1) and 
(2) refer to firms with low industry R&D growth opportunities whereas specifications (3) and (4) refer to firms with 
high industry R&D growth opportunities. The dependent variable is the annual excess return of the firm relative to the 
Fama and French (1993) twenty-five value weighted size and book-to-market portfolios. CEO overconfidence, low 
and high confidence are based on a longholder measure. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm clustering. T-statistics are reported within brackets below the corresponding 
coefficient estimate. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Low R&D Growth Low R&D Growth High R&D Growth High R&D Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ΔCt 1.503 
(0.94) 
1.410 
(0.74) 
2.956*** 
(2.91) 
3.016*** 
(2.97) 
Overconfidentt 0.003 
(0.14) 
 
-0.051 
(-2.20) 
 
ΔCt  Overconfidentt -0.074 
(-0.19) 
 
0.735*** 
(2.40) 
 
Low confidencet  
0.034 
(0.74) 
 
-0.022 
(-0.68) 
ΔCt  Low confidencet  
0.116 
(0.16) 
 
0.581 
(1.18) 
High confidencet  
-0.004 
(-0.16) 
 
-0.060** 
(-2.22) 
ΔCt  High confidencet  
-0.157 
(-0.37) 
 
0.767** 
(2.22) 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.276 0.217 0.217 
Observations 1,331 1,331 1,686 1,686 
 
 
